Definition talk:Logical Inference

Once I've found my Kalish & Montague, I may want to argue the point that "truth value is wrong". But that won't be for a while. --prime mover 11:23, 9 July 2012 (UTC)


 * We may be on the 'modern vs. non-modern' track again, but I contend that formal proofs should be separated from models and semantics other than via soundness/completeness arguments. Therefore, 'truth value' may be appropriate, but in the current context it does not represent what the link was pointing after. It is a truth value in the sense that 'in this formal system, $p$ [is/isn't] a theorem', but not linked to boolean interpretations. This distinction is essential, the reason for model and proof theory being different fields in the first place. --Lord_Farin 11:44, 9 July 2012 (UTC)