American mathematician working on game theory, including equilibrium theory, learning in games, and evolutionary game theory.
- Born: March 2, 1957 in New York City
- 1986: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (Econometrica Vol. 54: 533 – 554) (with E.S. Maskin) www.jstor.org/stable/1911307
- 1989: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (Econometrica Vol. 57: 759 – 778) (with D.K. Levine) www.jstor.org/stable/1913771
- 1991: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Sequential Equilibrium (J. Econ. Theory Vol. 53: 236 – 260) (with Jean Tirole)
- 1991: On the Dispensability of Public Randomization in Discounted Repeating Games (J. Econ. Theory Vol. 53: 428 – 438) (with E.S. Maskin)
- 1992: Explaining Cooperation and Commitment in Repeated Games (Advances in Economic Theory Vol. I: 89 – 131) (edited by J.-J. Laffont)