Set of Gödel Numbers of Arithmetic Theorems Not Definable in Arithmetic
Theorem
Let $T$ be the set of theorems of some consistent theory in the language of arithmetic which contains minimal arithmetic.
The set of Gödel numbers of the theorems of $T$ is not definable in $T$.
Proof
Not only the proof is faulty, this theorem is wrong. If we have a recursively enumerable set A of axioms, then the set of theorems (and hence, the Gödel numbers of those) proven by A is recursively enumerable. Minimal arithmetic and PA are both recursively enumerable, and hence their theorems have a recursively enumerable set of Gödel numbers. Any recursively enumerable set is arithmetical with degree Sigma^0_1 in the arithmetical hierarchy. Moreover, there is already a well known provability predicate Pr(x) in the language of Peano arithmetic. Indeed, if we use the diagonal lemma on ~Pr(x) to get a sentence with T proves G iff ~Pr(G), then we will have an unprovable sentence.
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The proof is by contradiction.
Let $\Theta$ be the set of Gödel numbers of the theorems of $T$, and
suppose it is defined in $T$ by the formula $\theta(y)$.
Since $T$ contains $Q$, we may apply the Diagonal Lemma to $\neg\theta(y)$.
This gives us a sentence $G$ such that
- $T\vdash G \leftrightarrow \neg\theta(\hat G)$
where $\hat G$ is the Gödel number of $G$ (more accurately, it is the term in the language of arithmetic obtained by applying the function symbol $s$ to $0$ this many times).
The below argument is not correct. T does not necessarily prove that $\neg\theta(\hat G)$ just because it does not prove G. PA has a provability predicate Pr(x) which satisfies the property that if PA proves G, then PA proves Pr($\hat G$). The step used here assumes a somewhat similar property in the opposite direction that our provability predicate satisfies if T does not prove G, then T proves $\neg\Theta(\hat G)$, which we did not have as an assumption on $\Theta(x)$.
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Suppose $G$ is not a theorem of $T$.
- Then the Gödel number of $G$ is not in $\Theta$.
- Since $\theta$ defines $\Theta$ in $T$, this means that
- $T\vdash \neg\theta(\hat G)$
- But, by choice of $G$ (specifically, the bi-implication above), this gives us
- $T\vdash G$
- which contradicts $G$ not being a theorem of $T$
Thus, $G$ is a theorem of $T$.
- But, then the Gödel number of $G$ is in $\Theta$, and
- since $\theta$ defines $\Theta$ in $T$, this means that
- $T\vdash \theta(\hat G)$
- But, then this gives us
- $T\vdash \neg G$
- which contradicts $G$ being a theorem of $T$, since $T$ is consistent.
Since assuming $\Theta$ was definable in $T$ necessarily leads to a contradiction, we conclude that it is impossible.
$\blacksquare$
