Book:Martin J. Osborne/A Course in Game Theory

Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein: A Course in Game Theory

Published $\text {1994}$, MIT Press

ISBN 0-252-65040-1

Subject Matter

• Game Theory

Contents

Preface

1 Introduction

1.1 Game Theory

1.2 Games and Solutions

1.3 Game Theory and the Theory of Competitive Equilibrium

1.4 Rational Behaviour

1.5 The Steady State and Deductive Interpretations

1.6 Bounded Rationality

1.7 Terminology and Notation

Notes

$\text I$ Strategic Games

2 Nash Equilibrium

2.1 Strategic Games

2.2 Nash Equilibrium

2.3 Examples

2.4 Existence of a Nash Equilibrium

2.5 Strictly Competitive Games

2.6 Bayesian Games: Strategic Games with Imperfect Information

Notes

3 Mixed, Correlated, and Evolutionary Equilibrium

4 Rationalizability and Iterated Elimination of Dominated Actions

5 Knowledge and Equilibrium

$\text {II}$ Extensive Games with Perfect Information

6 Extensive Games with Perfect Information

7 Bargaining Games

8 Repeated Games

9 Complexity Considerations in Repeated Games

10 Implementation Theory

$\text {III}$ Extensive Games with Imperfect Information

11 Extensive Games with Imperfect Information

12 Sequential Equilibrium

$\text {IV}$ Coalitional Games

13 The Core

14 Stable Sets, the Bargaining Set, and the Shapley Value

15 The Nash Solution

List of Results

References

Index

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