Book:Journal/Econometrica
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Econometrica
Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell
Dates
- Started publication: $1933$
- (current)
Featured Articles
- 1949: Tjalling C. Koopmans: Optimum Utilization of the Transportation System ( Vol. 17 (supplement): pp. 136 – 145) www.jstor.org/stable/1907301
- 1952: A. Charnes, W.W. Cooper and B. Mellon: Blending Aviation Gasolines -- a Study in Programming Interdependent Activities in an Integrated Oil Company ( Vol. 20: pp. 135 – 159) www.jstor.org/stable/1907844
- 1952: A. Charnes: Optimality and Degeneracy in Linear Programming ( Vol. 20: pp. 160 – 170) www.jstor.org/stable/1907845
- 1953: L.J. Savage: Three Short Papers on Game Theory that involve Chance and the Skill of the Players ( Vol. 21: pp. 97 – 117), consisting of translations of:
- 1953: Émile Borel: The Theory of Play and Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernels ( Vol. 21: pp. 97 – 100) www.jstor.org/stable/1906946
- 1953: Émile Borel: On Games that Involve Chance and the Skill of the Players ( Vol. 21: pp. 101 – 115) www.jstor.org/stable/1906947
- 1953: Émile Borel: On Systems of Linear Forms of Skew Symmetric Determinant and the General Theory of Play ( Vol. 21: pp. 116 – 117) www.jstor.org/stable/1906948
- 1953: I.N. Herstein and John Milnor: An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility ( Vol. 21: pp. 291 – 297) www.jstor.org/stable/1905540
- 1953: A. Charnes and W.W. Cooper: Scheduling of Manufactured Product (abstract) ( Vol. 21: pp. 480 – 481)
- 1954: Daniel Bernoulli: Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk ( Vol. 22: pp. 23 – 36) www.jstor.org/stable/1909829
- 1956: John G. Kemeny, Gerald L. Thompson and Oskar Morgenstern: A Generalization of the von Neumann Model of an Expanding Economy ( Vol. 24: pp. 115 – 135) www.jstor.org/stable/1905746
- 1964: R.J. Aumann: Markets with a Continuum of Traders ( Vol. 32: pp. 39 – 50) www.jstor.org/stable/1913732
- 1964: John W. Pratt: Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large ( Vol. 32, no. 1/2: pp. 122 – 136) www.jstor.org/stable/1913738
- 1975: R.J. Aumann: Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders ( Vol. 43: pp. 611 – 646) www.jstor.org/stable/1913073
- 1979: Roger B. Myerson: Incentive-Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem ( Vol. 47: pp. 61 – 73) www.jstor.org/stable/1912346
- 1979: Hervé Moulin: Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes ( Vol. 47: pp. 1337 – 1351) www.jstor.org/stable/1914004
- 1981: Roger B. Myerson: Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems ( Vol. 49: pp. 883 – 897) www.jstor.org/stable/1912508
- 1982: David M. Kreps and Robert B. Wilson: Sequential Equilibria ( Vol. 50: pp. 863 – 894) www.jstor.org/stable/1912767
- 1983: Roger B. Myerson: Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal ( Vol. 51: pp. 1767 – 1797) www.jstor.org/stable/1912116
- 1984: Roger B. Myerson: Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information ( Vol. 52: pp. 461 – 489) www.jstor.org/stable/1911499
- 1985: R.J. Aumann: An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value ( Vol. 53: pp. 599 – 612) www.jstor.org/stable/1911657
- 1986: D. Fudenberg and E.S. Maskin: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information ( Vol. 54: pp. 533 – 554) www.jstor.org/stable/1911307
- 1986: Roger B. Myerson: Multistage Games with Communication ( Vol. 54: pp. 323 – 358) www.jstor.org/stable/1913154
- 1986: R.J. Aumann: On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: Rejoinder ( Vol. 54: pp. 985 – 989) www.jstor.org/stable/1912848
- 1987: R.J. Aumann: Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality ( Vol. 55: pp. 1 – 18) www.jstor.org/stable/1911154
- 1987: David M. Kreps and Garey Ramey: Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality ( Vol. 55: pp. 1331 – 1348) www.jstor.org/stable/1913559
- 1989: D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player ( Vol. 57: pp. 759 – 778) www.jstor.org/stable/1913771
- 1993: Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme: Global games and equilibrium selection ( Vol. 61: pp. 989 – 1018) www.jstor.org/stable/2951491
- 1995: Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger: Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium ( Vol. 63: pp. 1161 – 1180) www.jstor.org/stable/2171725