Book:Journal/Econometrica

Econometrica

Publisher: Wiley-Blackwell

Started publication: $1933$

(current)

1933: Harold Hotelling: Note on Edgeworth's taxation phenomenon and Professor Garver's additional condition on demand functions (Vol. 1, no. 4: pp. 408 – 409) www.jstor.org/stable/1907332

1935: Harold Hotelling: Demand functions with limited budgets (Vol. 3, no. 1: pp. 66 – 78) www.jstor.org/stable/1907346

1938: Harold Hotelling: The general welfare in relation to problems of taxation and of railway and utility rates (Vol. 6, no. 3: pp. 242 – 269) www.jstor.org/stable/1907054

1939: Abraham Wald: A New Formula for the Index of Cost of Living (Vol. 7: pp. 319 – 331) www.jstor.org/stable/906982

1949: Tjalling C. Koopmans: Optimum Utilization of the Transportation System (Vol. 17 (supplement): pp. 136 – 145) www.jstor.org/stable/1907301

1952: A. Charnes, W.W. Cooper and B. Mellon: Blending Aviation Gasolines -- a Study in Programming Interdependent Activities in an Integrated Oil Company (Vol. 20: pp. 135 – 159) www.jstor.org/stable/1907844

1952: A. Charnes: Optimality and Degeneracy in Linear Programming (Vol. 20: pp. 160 – 170) www.jstor.org/stable/1907845

1953: L.J. Savage: Three Short Papers on Game Theory that involve Chance and the Skill of the Players (Vol. 21: pp. 97 – 117), consisting of translations of:
- 1953: Émile Borel: The Theory of Play and Integral Equations with Skew Symmetric Kernels (Vol. 21: pp. 97 – 100) www.jstor.org/stable/1906946
- 1953: Émile Borel: On Games that Involve Chance and the Skill of the Players (Vol. 21: pp. 101 – 115) www.jstor.org/stable/1906947
- 1953: Émile Borel: On Systems of Linear Forms of Skew Symmetric Determinant and the General Theory of Play (Vol. 21: pp. 116 – 117) www.jstor.org/stable/1906948

1953: I.N. Herstein and John Milnor: An Axiomatic Approach to Measurable Utility (Vol. 21: pp. 291 – 297) www.jstor.org/stable/1905540

1953: A. Charnes and W.W. Cooper: Scheduling of Manufactured Product (abstract) (Vol. 21: pp. 480 – 481)

1954: Daniel Bernoulli: Exposition of a New Theory on the Measurement of Risk (Vol. 22: pp. 23 – 36) www.jstor.org/stable/1909829

1956: John G. Kemeny, Gerald L. Thompson and Oskar Morgenstern: A Generalization of the von Neumann Model of an Expanding Economy (Vol. 24: pp. 115 – 135) www.jstor.org/stable/1905746

1964: R.J. Aumann: Markets with a Continuum of Traders (Vol. 32: pp. 39 – 50) www.jstor.org/stable/1913732

1964: John W. Pratt: Risk Aversion in the Small and in the Large (Vol. 32, no. 1/2: pp. 122 – 136) www.jstor.org/stable/1913738

1975: R.J. Aumann: Values of Markets with a Continuum of Traders (Vol. 43: pp. 611 – 646) www.jstor.org/stable/1913073

1979: Roger B. Myerson: Incentive-Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (Vol. 47: pp. 61 – 73) www.jstor.org/stable/1912346

1979: Hervé Moulin: Dominance Solvable Voting Schemes (Vol. 47: pp. 1337 – 1351) www.jstor.org/stable/1914004

1981: Roger B. Myerson: Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems (Vol. 49: pp. 883 – 897) www.jstor.org/stable/1912508

1982: David M. Kreps and Robert B. Wilson: Sequential Equilibria (Vol. 50: pp. 863 – 894) www.jstor.org/stable/1912767

1983: Roger B. Myerson: Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (Vol. 51: pp. 1767 – 1797) www.jstor.org/stable/1912116

1984: Roger B. Myerson: Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information (Vol. 52: pp. 461 – 489) www.jstor.org/stable/1911499

1985: R.J. Aumann: An Axiomatization of the Non-Transferable Utility Value (Vol. 53: pp. 599 – 612) www.jstor.org/stable/1911657

1986: D. Fudenberg and E.S. Maskin: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information (Vol. 54: pp. 533 – 554) www.jstor.org/stable/1911307

1986: Roger B. Myerson: Multistage Games with Communication (Vol. 54: pp. 323 – 358) www.jstor.org/stable/1913154

1986: R.J. Aumann: On the Non-Transferable Utility Value: Rejoinder (Vol. 54: pp. 985 – 989) www.jstor.org/stable/1912848

1987: R.J. Aumann: Correlated Equilibrium as an Expression of Bayesian Rationality (Vol. 55: pp. 1 – 18) www.jstor.org/stable/1911154

1987: David M. Kreps and Garey Ramey: Structural Consistency, Consistency, and Sequential Rationality (Vol. 55: pp. 1331 – 1348) www.jstor.org/stable/1913559

1989: D. Fudenberg and D.K. Levine: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player (Vol. 57: pp. 759 – 778) www.jstor.org/stable/1913771

1993: Hans Carlsson and Eric van Damme: Global games and equilibrium selection (Vol. 61: pp. 989 – 1018) www.jstor.org/stable/2951491

1995: Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger: Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (Vol. 63: pp. 1161 – 1180) www.jstor.org/stable/2171725