Second Price Auction has Inefficient Equilibria
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Theorem
A second price auction has Nash equilibria which are inefficient.
Proof
 | This theorem requires a proof. In particular: Awaiting a reliable definition of inefficient Nash equilibrium You can help $\mathsf{Pr} \infty \mathsf{fWiki}$ by crafting such a proof. To discuss this page in more detail, feel free to use the talk page. When this work has been completed, you may remove this instance of {{ProofWanted}} from the code.If you would welcome a second opinion as to whether your work is correct, add a call to {{Proofread}} the page. |
Sources
- 1994: Martin J. Osborne and Ariel Rubinstein: A Course in Game Theory ... (previous) ... (next): $2.3$: Examples: Exercise $18.3$