Solution to Card Game with Bluffing
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Solution to Card Game with Bluffing
There are two players: $A$ and $B$.
First it is $A$'s move.
$A$ receives one of two possible cards: either the high card or the low card.
If he receives the high card, he must bid $2$ credits.
If he receives the low card, he has two options, either:
or
- $\map A 2: \quad$ He may bid $2$ credits.
If $A$ has bid $2$ credits, it is $B$'s move.
$B$ has two options, either:
- $\map B 1: \quad$ He may pay $1$ credit
or
- $\map B 2: \quad$ He may challenge $A$'s bid.
If $A$ had the high card, $B$ must pay $2$ credits to $A$.
If $A$ had the low card, $A$ must pay $2$ credits to $B$.
The play is complete.
Proof
From the payoff table:
$\text B$ | ||
$\text A$ | $\begin{array} {r {{|}} c {{|}} c {{|}} }
& B_1 & B_2 \\ \hline A_1 & 1/2 & 0 \\ \hline A_2 & 0 & -1 \\ \hline \end{array}$ |
The solution is:
- $A$ takes strategy $A_1$ for $2/3$ of the time, and $A_2$ for $1/3$ of the time.
- $B$ takes strategy $B_1$ for $2/3$ of the time, and $B_2$ for $1/3$ of the time.
![]() | This article contains statements that are justified by handwavery. In particular: It is not made clear in the source work why this is. You just get: "This is indeed a solution, because no player can do better if the other sticks to his strategy, but could gain or lose more than $1/3$ (which is what $A$ gains now) if he departed from the optimal solution and his opponent took advantage of it." This is handwaving. A source work with a higher level of precision is needed here. You can help $\mathsf{Pr} \infty \mathsf{fWiki}$ by adding precise reasons why such statements hold. To discuss this page in more detail, feel free to use the talk page. When this work has been completed, you may remove this instance of {{Handwaving}} from the code.If you would welcome a second opinion as to whether your work is correct, add a call to {{Proofread}} the page. |
Sources
- 1956: Steven Vajda: The Theory of Games and Linear Programming ... (previous) ... (next): Chapter $\text{I}$: An Outline of the Theory of Games: $3$