Mathematician:Roger Bruce Myerson

Mathematician

American economist and political scientist.

Also active in the fields of game theory and mechanism design.

Nationality

American

History

• Born: March 29, 1951 in Boston, Massachusetts

Theorems and Definitions

• Myerson-Satterthwaite Theorem (with Mark Allen Satterthwaite)
• Myerson Mechanism
• Myerson Ironing

Publications

• 1977: Graphs and Cooperation in Games (Math. Oper. Res. Vol. 2: pp. 225 – 229)  www.jstor.org/stable/3689511

• 1978: Refinements of the Nash Equilibrium Concept (Int. J. Game Theory Vol. 7: pp. 73 – 80)

• 1978: Threat Equilibria and Fair Settlements in Cooperative Games (Math. Oper. Res. Vol. 3: pp. 265 – 274)  www.jstor.org/stable/3689625

• 1979: Incentive-Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem (Econometrica Vol. 47: pp. 61 – 73)  www.jstor.org/stable/1912346

• 1980: Conference Structures and Fair Allocation Rules (Int. J. Game Theory Vol. 9: pp. 169 – 182)

• 1981: Optimal Auction Design (Math. Oper. Res. Vol. 6: pp. 58 – 73)  www.jstor.org/stable/3689266

• 1981: Utilitarianism, Egalitarianism, and the Timing Effect in Social Choice Problems (Econometrica Vol. 49: pp. 883 – 897)  www.jstor.org/stable/1912508

• 1982: Optimal Coordination Mechanisms in Generalized Principal-Agent Problems (J. Math. Econ. Vol. 10: pp. 67 – 81)

• 1983: Mechanism Design by an Informed Principal (Econometrica Vol. 51: pp. 1767 – 1797)  www.jstor.org/stable/1912116

• 1983: Efficient Mechanisms for Bilateral Trading (J. Econ. Theory Vol. 29: pp. 265 – 281) (with Mark A. Satterthwaite)

• 1984: Two-Person Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information (Econometrica Vol. 52: pp. 461 – 489)  www.jstor.org/stable/1911499

• 1984: Cooperative Games with Incomplete Information (Int. J. Game Theory Vol. 13: pp. 69 – 96)

• 1985: Bayesian Equilibrium and Incentive Compatibility (Social Goals and Social Organization pp. 229 – 259) (edited by L. Hurwicz, D. Schmeidler and H. Sonnenschein)

• 1985: Analysis of Two Bargaining Problems with Incomplete Information (Game-Theoretic Models of Bargaining pp. 115 – 147) (edited by A.E. Roth)

• 1986: Acceptable and Predominant Correlated Equilibria (Int. J. Game Theory Vol. 15: pp. 133 – 154)

• 1986: Multistage Games with Communication (Econometrica Vol. 54: pp. 323 – 358)  www.jstor.org/stable/1913154

• 1986: An Introduction to Game Theory (Studies in Mathematical Economics pp. 1 – 61) (edited by S. Reiter)

• 1988: Sustainable Matching Plans with Adverse Selection (GEB )

• 1989: Credible Negotiation Statements and Coherent Plans (J. Econ. Theory Vol. 48: pp. 264 – 303)

• 1991: Game Theory

• 1991: Viscous Population Equilibria (GEB Vol. 3: pp. 101 – 109) (with Gregory B. Pollock and Jeroen M. Swinkels)

• 2005: Probability Models for Economic Decisions